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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Jonathan Martin II*
and Patricia-Anne Upson'
This Article surveys the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit precedent from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017.
This Article focuses on case law concerning laws enforced by the United
States Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board.'
The following is a discussion of those opinions. 2
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Supreme Court of the United States did not issue any decisions
affecting labor and employment laws enforced by the Department of
Labor and the National Labor Relations Board. However, the Court
heard oral arguments on October 2, 2017, for Ernst & Young LLP v.
Morris,3 NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 4 and Epic Systems Corp. v.

*Equity Partner in the firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review
(1992-1994); Administrative Editor (1993-1994). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAw (John E. Higgins Jr. et. al. eds., 7th ed. 2012 & Supp.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
-Associate in the firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014-2016). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. Developments in the area of employment discrimination law (i.e, alleged violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act) that occurred during the survey period are discussed
in John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,Eleventh Circuit Survey Law, 69 MERCER
L. REV. 1117 (2018).
2. For analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see W.
Jonathan Martin et al., Labor and Employment Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey Law, 68
MERCER L. REV. 1061 (2017).
3. 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-300).
4. 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-307).
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Lewis5 (consolidated on January 13, 2017) that could alter the landscape
of employee-employer arbitration agreements.6 The National Labor
Relations Board took issue with arbitration agreements that mandate

that employees waive their right to bring claims collectively; rather, the
employees must bring those claims on an individual basis.7 It remains to

be seen how the Supreme Court Justices will side on this pivotal labor
and employment issue.
II. FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)8 prohibits employers from
interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise any right provided under the FMLA.9 The courts have
recognized two claims from aggrieved employees, retaliation and
interference claims.10 Under the FMLA, employees are entitled to take
twelve weeks of leave for their own serious health conditions or the

serious health conditions of family members and be reinstated upon their
return from leave." For interference claims, employees must prove they
were denied one of these benefits. 12 However, the denial of a benefit is
not the only way employers can interfere with the right of an employee;
an employer may also be responsible for interference where it
discourages its employees from using the leave to which they are

entitled. 13 In addition to proving there was interference, an employee
must "demonstrate some harm remediable by either 'damages' or
'equitable relief."' 14
As for retaliation, an employee must prove that the employer
"intentionally discriminated against her for having exercised an FMLA
right." 15 This can be shown either through direct or circumstantial

&

5. 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-285).
6. David Phippin, Executive Labor Summary-September/October 2017, CONSTANGY,
BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, https://www.constangy.com/newsroom-newsletters-760
#continued (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
7. Kim Seten, Class Action Outlook-Winter 2017, CONsTANGY, BROOKs, SMITH
PROPHETE, https://www.constangy.com/newsroom-newsletters-685#vacancy (last visited
Mar. 9, 2018).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2018).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2018).
10. Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001); 29
C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2018).
11. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206.
12. Martin v. Brevard Cty. Pub. Sch., 543 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 2008).
13. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207.
14. Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014).
15. Diamond v. Hospice of Fla. Keys, Inc., 677 F. App'x 586, 594 (11th Cir. 2017).
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evidence. 16 The courts will apply the three-part burden shifting analysis
17
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, where there is only
18
First, the plaintiff must show the three
circumstantial evidence.
elements of a prima facie case: "(1) [H]e engaged in statutorily protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the
19
decision was causally related to the protected activity." If the plaintiff
can make out a prima facie case, then it is up to the defendant-employer
20
to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action.
If the employer can do that, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
21
to show pretext or that the proffered reason is not true.
In Holton v. First Coast Service Options, Inc.,22 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed that the plaintiffs FMLA rights were neither interfered with,
23
nor was she retaliated against for asserting those rights. The plaintiff
requested and was approved for FMLA leave to treat back pain. After two
months of FLMA leave, the plaintiff returned to work and informed First
Coast that her chiropractor advised that she should only work for four
hours per day for two weeks. Human resources informed the plaintiff she
needed a letter from a physician to return on a reduced schedule, and if
she returned on a full schedule, she would be expected to fulfill all of her
24
job duties. Otherwise, the plaintiff was free to apply for other positions.
The next day, the plaintiff contacted the Department of Labor (DOL),
and as a result, the DOL contacted First Coast to inform them that the
note from the chiropractor should be sufficient for the plaintiff to return
to work on a reduced schedule. First Coast attempted to contact the
plaintiff to inform her she could return to work, but they were unable to
reach her, and she never returned to work. As a result, she was
terminated. The plaintiff filed a claim for FMLA interference and
retaliation along with a claim under the Americans with Disabilities
Act 25 for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary
26
judgment on all claims. The plaintiff appealed.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 801.
Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268.
Id.
Id.
703 F. App'x 917 (11th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-7251 (Jan. 5, 2018).
Id. at 919.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018).
Holton, 703 F. App'x at 918-19.
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 27 As to the plaintiffs FMLA claims, the
court held that there was no interference because the plaintiff sought to
return to work "on a modified basis, which is not a right protected by the
FMLA."28 The FMLA only requires that employers allow an employee to

return to their original position or to an equivalent position held by the
employee when the leave commenced. 29 Since First Coast made this
opportunity available for the plaintiff, it did not interfere with her rights
under the FMLA.30 Likewise, there was no retaliation by First Coast
because it presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for why it
terminated the plaintiff-she did not report for work.31 To overcome this
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff would need to
present evidence of pretext, which tended to show that the reasons
presented by the employer were not the truth. 32 Here, the plaintiff failed
to present any such evidence, and the "[c]ourts will not second-guess an
employer's proffered reason, so long as it is one that might motivate a
reasonable employer." 33 Therefore, the defendant was entitled to
summary judgment on all claims. 34
Conversely, in Diamond v. Hospice of Florida Keys, Inc.,35 the
Eleventh Circuit held that summary judgment was inappropriate as to
the claims of FMLA interference and retaliation because there was
evidence that the employer discouraged the plaintiff from using FMLA
and evidence of pretext as related to the plaintiffs termination. 36 The
plaintiff, Jill Diamond, worked as a clinical social worker for Hospice of
Florida. Keys. During her employment, she would periodically take
FMLA leave to care for her elderly parents. In March and April of 2014,
the plaintiff had to take unforeseeable FMLA leave to care for her
mother. The plaintiff submitted the necessary paperwork from her
mother's physician related to the FMLA approved leave. Hospice
informed the plaintiff that since the leave was unforeseeable, she would
also need to submit travel receipts or similar documentation. The
plaintiff questioned why she needed to provide this additional
information. After approving more FMLA days for the plaintiff, Hospice

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 923.
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 923.
Id.
Id.
Id.
677 F. App'x 586 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 596.
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told her she might want to conserve her remaining leave because it was
running low, which caused the plaintiff to cancel two of the days she
planned to use to take care of her mother. Five days after the plaintiff
questioned the need for additional documentation, she was terminated.
Hospice cited poor job performance as the reason for termination, which
included not updating her plan notes before leaving for the day and
leaving the building without permission during a state survey without
authorization. The plaintiff filed a claim for FMLA interference and
retaliation, and the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted summary judgment for the defendant on both
claims. 37
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial on the merits.38 As to the
plaintiffs interference claim, the court said that retaliation encompasses
more than just the failure to allow an employee to take the leave and
return to their position when the leave concludes; rather, the employer
also may not discourage an employee from using the leave. 39 This is
important because a plaintiff need not show that they were denied leave
or lost wages to prove interference but rather may rely on the fact leave
was discouraged. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that Hospice may have discouraged the plaintiff from
taking her leave, including them telling her that her continued absences
were impacting the care of patients, requiring her to provide more
documentation than necessary under the regulations, or encouraging her
to save her leave. 40
As to the retaliation claim, the court held that the plaintiff presented
ample evidence of pretext. 4' The plaintiff pointed to a number of negative
comments about the plaintiffs use of leave, which included comments
claiming the amount of leave the plaintiff took was affecting the quality
of patient care.4 2 Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Hospice both interfered with the plaintiffs leave and retaliated against
her for using that leave. 43
The "causation" element of a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation may
be inferred by temporal proximity between the protected act and the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

588-91.
596.
593-94.
594.
595.
596.
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adverse action. 44 In this regard, the Eleventh Circuit held in Jones v. Gulf
Coast Healthcare of Delaware, LLC,45 that the temporal proximity
between protected activity and adverse employment action for FMLA
retaliation should be determined using the last day of the employee's
FMLA leave, not the first. 46 The plaintiff, Rodney Jones, was the
Activities Director at a long-term health care facility where he was
required to perform both desk and active work. The plaintiff went out on
FMLA leave to treat a torn rotator cuff, and on the last day of his FMLA
leave, he presented his employer with a doctor's note stating he was
restricted to light duty for approximately six weeks. However, he was not
allowed to return on light duty and was told by his supervisor he needed
an unqualified fitness for duty certification before returning to work. He
was unable to get that certification prior to the end of his FMLA leave
and instead requested and was approved for an additional thirty days of
unpaid medical leave. 47
During his additional thirty days of medical leave, the plaintiff went
on vacation to St. Martin and visited Busch Gardens, twice. During his
trips to Busch Gardens, he took pictures and sent them to his staff for
decorating ideas and also posted photos from his vacation on his social
media page. When he returned from leave, his supervisor confronted him
with these pictures and stated that "corporate" believed that based on
these pictures the plaintiff may have been well enough to return at an
earlier date. The plaintiff was suspended pending further investigation
into his activities while on medical leave. Thereafter, he was terminated.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
granted summary judgment for the employer. 48 While the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the interference
claim, it reversed and remanded the decision as to the retaliation claim.4 9
As to the interference claim, the plaintiff contended that other
employees returning from leave were not required to submit fitness for
duty certifications.5 0 However, the court held that the two employees
identified by the plaintiff as comparators were not similarly situated
because they had different jobs that required substantially more physical
activity than the plaintiffs job.51

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2017).
854 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1265-66.
Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1268-69.
Id. at 1269.
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With the retaliation claim, the court reasoned that the plaintiff
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a prima facie
case. 52 The defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff engaged in a
protected activity by taking FMLA leave and suffered an adverse
employment action when he was terminated. 53 However, the question the
court had to answer was whether there was a causal connection between
the two.6 4 It is well established that temporal proximity of more than

three to four months for the purpose of causation is too remote.5 5 On
appeal the defense argued temporal proximity was lacking because it
should be measured from the first day of the plaintiff s FMLA leave-the
day the protected activity began.5 6 While the plaintiff argued the
opposite-that it should be measured from the day the FMLA leave
ends.5 7 The court reasoned that under the defendant's theory the "FMLA
leave would disadvantage those employees ... who need to take the full
12 weeks of FMLA leave at one time. . . these employees would never be
able to establish a prima facie case for FMLA retaliation based on
temporal proximity."5 8 Therefore, the court held that temporal proximity
should be measured from the last day of the employee's FMIA leave.5 9
After determining that the plaintiff could make out a prima facie case,
the court continued the McDonnell Douglas analysis.6 0 In this regard, the
court observed that the employer put forth a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for termination including that the plaintiff
violated the social media policy and displayed poor judgment as a
supervisor. 61 The plaintiff contended that the defendant's reasons for
termination were inconsistent, and therefore, may not be the real and
true reason for his termination. 62 The court agreed and held that there
was sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to
pretext, and thus, remanded the case for trial on the merits.6 3
In Feise v. North Broward Hospital District,6 4 the Eleventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff failed to present any similarly-situated employees
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1275-76.
683 F. App'x 746 (11th Cir. 2017).
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who were treated better than she was, and she did not produce any
evidence that the reason given for her termination was pretextual. 65 The
plaintiff, Stacie Feise, a former employee of the defendant, North
Broward Hospital District, worked as a nurse in the pediatrics
department of Broward Health until she was fired for sleeping on the job.
The plaintiff claimed she did not fall asleep on the job and brought a
retaliation suit under the FMLA, claiming the real reason she had been
fired is because she had exercised her rights under the FMLA.66
Prior to being fired, the plaintiff had a series of medical issues that
caused her to miss work on many different occasions, including when she
was hospitalized for pneumonia. In August 2013, the plaintiffs
supervisor was relocated, and Caryn Bock began to supervise the
plaintiff. Although Bock knew the plaintiff had been hospitalized for
pneumonia, she did not know the plaintiff had taken FMLA leave. The
plaintiff returned to work on September 6, 2013. A few days later, the
plaintiff was scheduled to work a twelve-hour overnight shift from 7:00
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Following this shift, the plaintiff was also supposed to
attend a staff meeting at 7:30 a.m. Although pediatric nurses are
permitted to take a break during their shifts, the plaintiff did not have
the opportunity to do so on that particular shift. Therefore, the plaintiff
took her break at the nurses' station after caring for her last patient. In
accordance with standard hospital practice, the plaintiff remained on the
clock after 7:00 a.m. on September 17, 2013, while taking her break. It
was at this time the plaintiff allegedly fell asleep.67
While the plaintiff and at least one other nurse deny that the plaintiff
was sleeping, Bock and other nurses claim the plaintiff was observed
sleeping at the nurses' station. Bock promptly reported to human
resources that the plaintiff had been sleeping while on duty and was
advised that doing so was a terminable offense. Two days later, the
plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with Bock, Human Resources
Specialist Maxine Trotter, and Regional Human Resources Director
Eileen O'Brien. During this meeting, the plaintiff again denied sleeping
while on duty. Two days later, on September 22, 2013, the plaintiff was
summoned to a second meeting with Bock and Trotter and shown video
surveillance of the sleeping incident and advised that she was being
terminated. Ultimately, the decision to terminate the plaintiff was made
by Trotter. Significantly, although Bock had no awareness of the
plaintiffs prior usage of FMIA leave, Trotter did. Prior to her

65. Id. at 754.
66. Id. at 748.
67. Id.
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termination, the plaintiff had never been written up or disciplined for
any reason.6 8
The plaintiff identified two individuals who had not taken FMLA leave
whom she claimed had engaged in similar conduct but had not been
terminated. First, she identified a senior medical technologist who had
been caught sleeping in a chemistry lab and who had been suspended for
two weeks. Second, the plaintiff identified a medical technician who had
not been terminated; even though he had repeatedly abandoned a child
patient who was supposed to be under close supervision because he
threatened self-harm.6 9 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, however, found that these two individuals
were not proper comparators and granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 70 Furthermore, the district court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the defendant's stated reason for
terminating her-namely, that she had been sleeping on the job-was
pretextual.71 The plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff argued that the district court erred in conducting its
comparator analysis and that she had enough evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to find that the defendant's alleged reason for firing her
was pretextual. 72 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff.73 In
affirming the district court's award of summary judgment to the
defendant, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the senior medical
technologist, who had fallen asleep in a chemistry lab, was not similarly
situated to the plaintiff because he had provided the defendant with a
physician's note explaining that he was on medication that could cause
him to fall asleep at work. 74 Likewise, it determined that the medical
technician who abandoned his patient was also not a proper comparator
because he had not fallen asleep while on duty. 75 The Eleventh Circuit
further agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had not presented
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant's reason for firing
her was a pretext for unlawful retaliation under the FMLA. 76

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

748-49.
751-52.
750.
751.
751-52.
752.
753-54.
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III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)77 requires employers to pay
covered employees engaged in commerce a minimum of $7.25 for all
hours worked. 78 Additionally, if an employee works over forty hours in
any workweek, an employer is required to pay that employee overtime at
79
a rate of one and one-half times the employee's regular rate. Employees
can be "covered" by the FLSA in one of two ways: enterprise coverage or
individual coverage.80 For enterprise coverage, an employee must work
for an employer that has at least two employees and has an annual dollar
of sales or business done of at least $500,000.81 Employees may be
covered individually if their work regularly involves them in commerce
between the states and they are "engaged in commerce or in the
82
production of goods for commerce."

A. Liability Under the FLSA
In Axel v. Fields Motorcars of Florida, Inc.,83 the Eleventh Circuit
determined that summary judgment was inappropriate where over the
course of fifteen months the plaintiff acted as both a trainee and an
employee but received no compensation during that period of time. 84 The
plaintiff, Scott Axel, shadowed his father at Field Motorcars of Florida in
order to learn the automobile wholesale industry. The plaintiff also
posted cars for sale online, researched cars for sale at auction, and
purchased cars from other dealerships and brought them to the store
where he was working, all of which was not under the supervision of his
father. However, the plaintiff rarely came to work when his father was
not there and only attended daily meetings and reviewed inventory with
his father. The plaintiff stopped coming to work when his father was fired
85
from the dealership.
In analyzing this case, the court focused on whether the plaintiff was
a trainee or an employee throughout his employment with Fields.86 To
determine this, the court must "look to the totality of the

77. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).

78. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2018).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2018).
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. No. 16-13829, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19524 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017).
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *4-5.

86. Id. at *7.
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circumstances," 87 while focusing on who is the primary beneficiary of the
relationship.8 8 The court outlined the factors to consider in analyzing this
relationship:
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand
that there is no expectation of compensation. Any promise of
compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an
employee-and vice versa.
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would be
similar to that which would be given in an educational environment,
including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by
educational institutions.
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern's formal
education program integrated coursework or the receipt of academic
credit.
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern's
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar.
5. The extent to which the internship's duration is limited to the period
in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial learning.
6. The extent to which the intern's work complements, rather than
displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant
educational benefits to the intern.
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that
the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the
conclusion of the internship.89
In going through these factors, the court analyzed facts pointing to the
plaintiffs trainee status including: (1) his lack of expectation for
compensation; (2) that there was no displacement of work for any other
employee; and (3) that there was no understanding that the plaintiff
would be entitled to a paid position at the end of the training.9 0
Nevertheless, facts indicating an employee-employer relationship existed
87. Id.
88. Id. at *9.
89. Id. at *910. On January 9, 2018, the Department of Labor announced that it would
be scrapping its six-factor test, in favor of the "primary beneficiary test" outlined above.
Ellen Kearns, DOL Adopts More Employer-Friendly Position on Unpaid Interns,
CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, https://www.constangy.cominewsroom-news
letters-770 (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
90. Axel, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19524, at *12-16.
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included that the plaintiff was not enrolled in a formal educational
program, that there was no limited period where training was provided,
instead it seemed indefinite, and that he conducted duties in addition to
shadowing his father.91 Thus, the court could not determine the primary
beneficiary of this relationship. 92 Since the court could not determine how
much time the plaintiff spent on activities outside of his training, hence,
acting as an employee, the court held that summary judgment was
inappropriate.93
In Meeks v. Pasco County Sheriff,94 a former deputy sheriff for Pasco
County, Florida, Shawn Meeks, brought a claim for unpaid overtime
wages against the sheriff, his former employer. 95 During the plaintiffs
employment, he was "assigned a patrol car for use in carrying out his
[daily] patrol duties."9 6 Deputies who lived within Pasco County were
allowed to use their patrol cars to travel from home to work and from
work to home, but the plaintiff was not allowed to do so because he lived
more than fifteen miles outside of the county. Because of this, the
plaintiff was required to store his patrol car at a secure location at the
Patrol Division Office. Each day at the beginning of his shift, the plaintiff
would drive his personal vehicle to the Patrol Division Office and pick up
his patrol car. He would then travel to his designated patrol zone. While
driving his patrol car from the Patrol Division Office to his designated
patrol zone, the plaintiff was required to turn on his police radio and
respond to any emergency calls while en route. At the end of his shift, he
would drive his patrol car back to the Patrol Division Office, secure it,
and then drive his personal vehicle home. Notably, while the plaintiff was
driving his patrol car between the Patrol Division Office and his
designated patrol zone, the sheriff did not compensate the plaintiff unless
he responded to an emergency call.97
On June 22, 2015, just a few months after the plaintiffs employment
ended, the plaintiff brought a claim for unpaid overtime wages alleging
that the amount of time he spent transporting his patrol car between the
Patrol Division Office and his designated patrol zone was compensable
working time. The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
awarded him liquidated damages. The court denied the sheriffs motion

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at *16-17.
Id. at *18.
688 F. App'x 714 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id.
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for summary judgment. In ruling in the plaintiffs favor, the district court
determined that the plaintiffs transporting of his patrol car between the
Patrol Division Office and his designated patrol zone was compensable
activity because it was "integral and indispensable" to the performance
of his job. The district court further concluded that liquidated damages
were appropriate because the sheriff had offered "no real evidence" that
he acted in good faith in refusing to compensate the plaintiff for this
activity. The sheriff appealed.9 8
In affirming the ruling of the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed that the plaintiffs activity of daily transporting his patrol car
between the Patrol Division Office and his designated patrol zone was an
"intrinsic element" of patrol duties, and therefore, compensable.9 9 As to
the question of whether liquidated damages were properly awarded, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that the sheriff
had not acted in good faith because the evidence actually revealed that
the sheriff knew or had reason to know that its failure to compensate
officers like the plaintiff for time spent transporting their patrol cars
violated the FLSA, but he did so anyway.100
In determining exempt status under the FLSA, job titles are
irrelevant. In Boyle v. City of Pell City, 10 1 the Eleventh Circuit held that
despite the work title, an employer was only required to pay a plaintiff
one and a half times their regular rate of the actual work performed.102
The plaintiff, Paul Boyle, was employed by the street department of Pell
City, Alabama (the City) as a heavy equipment operator when he was
seriously injured while working. That injury, in 2001, caused the plaintiff
to develop spinal stenosis, chronic nerve pain, and other related medical
conditions. Due to his injury, the plaintiff could no longer perform the
duties of the heavy equipment operator position; however, the
superintendent of the street department allowed the plaintiff to perform
office work as an accommodation. After four years, the plaintiff was
allowed to perform the duties of the street department foreman, while
the incumbent in that position voluntarily worked as a mechanic. Around
that time, the plaintiff, the street department superintendent, and the
City's Human Resources Director, Judy Tipton, entered into a written
agreement that stated that the plaintiff agreed to perform the duties of
the street department foreman "for a period of time not exceeding but not

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 717-18.
866 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1286.
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limited to two years without renegotiating the agreement." 103 According
to the terms of this agreement, although the plaintiff was performing the
duties of the street department foreman, he would not be given that
position's formal title; instead, the foreman would retain that title even
though he was working as a mechanic. The agreement further stated that
because the plaintiffs transfer to the street department foreman position
was deemed a lateral move, he would only be compensated at the hourly
rate of a heavy equipment operator, as opposed to the higher hourly rate
set for the street department foreman position. 104
Although this agreement was supposed to be renegotiated after two
years, the plaintiff performed the duties of the street department
foreman for approximately seven years. In 2012, a new superintendent
was hired, and the plaintiff was removed from the street department
foreman position and assigned to work inventory. Although the plaintiff
complained to the new superintendent that the activities involved in
conducting inventory made the job difficult for him to do, the
The new
his complaints.
allegedly ignored
superintendent
superintendent also assigned the plaintiff to operate heavy equipment
over the plaintiffs protests that his medical conditions precluded him
from doing that job. Ultimately, on October 1, 2012, the plaintiff resigned
when his second application for disability retirement was approved. 105
Prior to retiring on August 18, 2014, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against the City. Among other claims, the plaintiff brought suit under
the FLSA, claiming that the City had violated the FLSA by paying
overtime at the heavy equipment operator rate, instead of the street
department foreman rate. The City moved to dismiss the plaintiffs FLSA
cause of action on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs FLSA claim,
which the plaintiff appealed. 106 In affirming the district court's dismissal
of his FLSA claim, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the agreement he
signed in November 2005, very clearly stated that he would be
compensated at the hourly rate of a heavy equipment operator and not
at the higher hourly rate of the street department foreman position. 107
Since the plaintiff had been paid overtime at the rate of a heavy

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1284.
at 1284-85.
at 1285-86.
at 1285.
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equipment operator, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to state a plausible claim that the City violated the FLSA.108
B. Retaliation
In addition to the failure to properly pay employees minimum wage
and overtime, employers also violate the FLSA by retaliating against
workers that allege violations of the FLSA. The plaintiffs in Perez v.
Garcia,09 worked as secretaries at a law firm, where the owner and main
attorney, Anastasia Garcia, was described as "crazy" and "bipolar."1 10
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that in this case, those two
attributes helped show that the plaintiffs were not retaliated against
when they complained about not being paid overtime. 1 1' On February 4,
2015, Garcia sent two emails to her associate detailing her unhappiness
with the two secretaries and intent to terminate their employment soon.
Since the secretaries had access to Garcia's email, they saw these two
emails. The next day, Perez sent Garcia an email asking to be
compensated for all of the overtime hours she worked. Then, a couple of
days later, the plaintiffs obtained counsel to recover their unpaid
overtime.1 12
The plaintiffs claim at that point, "Garcia became 'overtly' hostile to
them, called them derogatory names, [and] changed the office locks,"
among other things. Because of this, the plaintiffs resigned their
employment and filed a claim for wage violations and retaliation under
the FLSA. They claimed that they were forced to resign, which they
alleged was retaliation for their complaints about unpaid wages. A
finding of constructive discharge, however, requires, "a high degree of
deterioration in an employee's working conditions, approaching the level
of intolerable."113 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that it was
doubtful that this standard of intolerability could be met in such a short
period of time between when the plaintiffs complained and when they
quit.11 4 Additionally, the actions taken by Garcia were precisely the ones
she stated she would take in her February 4, 2015 email, and her
behavior mimicked what these plaintiffs should have already expected

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1286.
701 F. App'x 938 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id. at 939-40.
Id. at 940-41.
Id. at 941.
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from her.11 5 Therefore, all of these actions were simply "a continuation of
6
her behavior prior to the protected activity."" Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Garcia as to
the retaliation claim.117
C. FLSA Collective Actions
In Freixa v. Prestige Cruise Services, LLC,118 the Eleventh Circuit held
that where a district court must use a "different [and] 'reasonable and
equitable method"'119 under 29 C.F.R. § 778.120120 to allocate
commissions among workweeks, the court must only apportion the
amount back over the periods in which it was earned.121 Here, Sean
Freixa sold cruise services and was paid $500 a week plus commissions
for each booking sold. Commissions were paid on a monthly basis
following the month that the employee sold them. Freixa was classified
as exempt from overtime under the "retail or service establishment"
exemption for the FLSA, which states:
[I]f (1) the regular rate of pay of such employee is in excess of one and
one-half times the minimum hourly rate applicable to him .. . ,and (2)
more than half of his compensation for a representative period (not
less than one month) represents commissions on goods and services.
The "regular rate of pay" includes commissions, not only salary.1 22
Therefore, Freixa had to make at least $10.88 an hour (time and
one-half minimum wage) for each hour worked to be eligible for this
exemption. The parties agree that Freixa worked, on average, sixty hours
per week, but disagreed as to the exact number of hours.1 23
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
decided that because it was difficult to allocate certain commissions to
specific weeks, the court would invoke its power to come up with a
reasonable and equitable method to allocate the commissions. Therefore,
the district court decided to allocate the commissions earned the whole
year to the hours worked for the entire year.1 24 On appeal, the Eleventh

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
853 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1345.
29 C.F.R. § 778.120 (2018).
Freixa, 853 F.3d at 1345-46.
Id. at 1346 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); 29 C.F.R. § 778.117).
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345-46.
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Circuit held that this method of allocation was inappropriate because the
commissions may only be allocated across the period in which they were
earned. 125 Since the employees earned commissions on a monthly basis,
then those earned commissions could only be applied to the weeks within
the monthly period.1 26
Moreover, because the commissions were inappropriately allocated
and the parties did not agree on the number of hours worked per week,
the grant of summary judgment was improper. 127 The court reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 128
In Malivuk v. Ameripark, LLC,12 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that there
is no private right of action under a regulation promulgated by the
Department of Labor in 2011, concerning tipped employees.1s0 The
plaintiff, a valet driver, brought this action on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated valet drivers against their employer Ameripark. The
plaintiff claimed the employer allocated a portion of the employees' tips
for themselves and that this was a violation of the FLSA.1 3 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs case on failure to state a
claim.132

At Ameripark, valet drivers received both wages and tips, and
Ameripark did not claim a "tip credit." 33 A tipped employee may be paid
a minimum wage of $2.13, as opposed to the normal $7.25, and the
employer may claim a "tip credit" to get the credit to the regular
minimum wage of $7.25.134 If the employee does not receive sufficient tips
to raise them to $7.25, the employer must pay the difference to the
employee.135

Importantly, in May of 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a
regulationl36 that stated "tips are the property of the employee whether

125. Id. at 1347.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1348.
128. Id.
129. 694 F. App'x 705 (11th Cir. 2017).
130. Id. at 710.
131. Id. at 706.
132. Id. at 711.
133. Id. at 706-07.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
135. Id.
136. Interestingly, the Department of Labor issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
December 5, 2017, with the intent of rescinding this 2011 regulation. This new rule would
permit the sharing of tips among more employees as long as the employees are paid the full
mmnmum wage and the employer does not take a tip credit. United States Department of
Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Proposal Gives Freedom to Share Tips Between
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or not the employer has taken a tip credit under [§ 203(m)] of the
FLSA."137 Many courts have refused to enforce this regulation because
they found that it is not entitled to Chevron deference.1 38 In holding that,
these courts found that the statute concerning tip credit is not
ambiguous; thus, the regulation is not filling a void left by Congress. 139
However, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was not necessary to decide
the level of deference to be afforded to this regulation in this case.140 As
the defendant argued, the DOL agreed in an amicus brief, and the court
held, there is no private right of action under this 2011 DOL
regulation.141 A private right of action only exists under §§ 206 and 207
of the FLSA, which means that to properly bring a suit under the FLSA,
a plaintiff (that is not the DOL) must claim either a minimum wage or
overtime violation.14 2 The plaintiff did not claim either. 143 Without this,
the plaintiffs claim was not properly before the court, therefore,
dismissal was appropriate.144
Like Malivuk, the plaintiffs in Rodriguez v. Gold Star, Inc., 145 were
valet drivers and were paid straight time for all hours worked, which
amounted to approximately one hundred hours per week.1 46 However,
they were not paid overtime for those hours. The plaintiffs argued on
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit that the valet drivers are covered under
enterprise coverage of the FLSA because they parked cars, which are
"materials" under § 203 of the FLSA.147
"Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce" means an enterprise that(A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced
for commerce by any person; and

Traditionally Tipped and Non-Tipped Workers, https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/
whd/whd20171204 (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
137. Malivuk, 694 F. App'x at 707 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 531.52) (emphasis omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 708.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 708-09.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 710.
145. 858 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2017).
146. Id. at 1368-69.
147. Id. at 1369.
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(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or
business done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at
148
the retail level that are separately stated).
In determining whether the plaintiff and those similarly situated
handled materials sufficient to meet the enterprise coverage test, this

court analyzed the definitions stated in 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A) of both
"goods" and "materials." 149 The Eleventh Circuit previously discussed the
term "materials" in Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Service Inc.,1so and
15 1
The "coming to rest
there it rejected the "coming to rest doctrine."
doctrine" is where there is no moving in commerce unless the employer
152
Thereby, if the
actually moved them into the state themselves.
employer bought the materials locally, the coverage would not apply. 153
15 4
While "goods"
The court then turned to the "handling" of materials.
is defined by the FLSA, "materials" is not. 155 Therefore, the court, after
using basic tenors of statutory interpretation, created the following
definition: "tools or other articles necessary for doing or making
something."156 An item will be considered a material if it fits the ordinary
definition of materials above, and it is a material to "be used
15 7
commercially in the employer's business."
The court held that the cars parked by the valet drivers were not
materials under the Act because the cars are not "tools necessary to do a
job; rather [it is a good] which [is] serviced by the employees using
tools." 15 8 Since the court determined that this was a "good" under the Act,
it fell into the "ultimate consumer exception," which states "after their
delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer
59
thereof other than a producer, manufacture, or processor thereof."1 In
this case, the ultimate consumer of the car is the owner; thus, the

148. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)).
149. Id. at 1369-70.
150. 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2010).

151. Rodriguez, 858 F.3d at 1369.
152.
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Id.
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commerce chain has stopped.16 0 Therefore, there is no enterprise
coverage of the valet drivers. 161
IV. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

&

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),162 the
Secretary has the authority to issue employers citations for violations of
OSHA standards. 163 An employer may request an evidentiary hearing to
protest that citation, which is conducted by an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).164 The ALJ conducts a review of the evidence presented by both
the employer and the Secretary and issues a decision based on the facts
and the legal arguments presented.1 65 After the AL issues a decision,
the losing party may request a review from the Commission.166 The
Commission may adopt the findings of the ALJ or conduct its own review
of the evidence to affirm, alter, or vacate the citation or proposed
penalty. 16 7
After a decision is issued by the Commission, a party may appeal
directly to the Eleventh Circuit.16 8 On appeal, the Commission's
determinations are given significant deference.169 Legal determinations
will only be overturned where they are '"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with [the] law."' 70 As to
factual determinations, if they are supported by substantial evidence on
the record, then they will be found conclusive.171
In Empire Roofing Co. Southeast, LLC v. Occupational Safety
Health Review Commission,172 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
Commission's decision to issue a penalty to the employer where an
employee rode in an aerial lift without fall protection.1 73 In 2013, during
a compliance review, an OSHA officer observed a foreman in an aerial
lift and learned that the foreman had transported two employees to the

160.
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164.
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168.
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170.
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Id. at 1371.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (2018).
29 U.S.C. § 658 (2018).
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Action Elec. Co., 868 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1329.
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Id. at 1328.
29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2018).
Action, 868 F.3d at 1329.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2002)).
Id.
No. 16-17309, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20444 (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2017).
Id. at *1-2.
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roof. None of these employees used safety harnesses while in the lift. The
officer issued a citation for "working from an aerial lift" without proper
safety harnesses. 174 The defendant contested the citation; an ALJ agreed
175
with the citation and the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision.
On appeal, the defendant argued that since the employees and
foreman were simply using the aerial lift for transportation purposes it
was not being used as described in the standard, which is "when working
from an aerial lift."176 Despite arguing the meaning of the phrase, the
defendants failed to provide the court with any definition or alternative
meaning for work, working, or when working from.1 7 7 Therefore, the
court turned to the Agency's interpretation of the phrase. 178 The Agency
includes transportation in its definition of "when working from an aerial
lift."'17 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that moving from
1 80
one work station to another is considered a work-related activity. This
interpretation is in line with the overall purpose of OSHA, which is to
assure safe and healthy working conditions. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision.181
1 82
the
In Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor v. Action Electric Co.,
that
basis
the
on
findings
Eleventh Circuit overturned the Commission's
83
the Secretary's interpretation should be given significant deference.'
Two Action Electric employees were sent to service fans in a cooling bed
at a steel mill in Cartersville, Georgia. This mill had safety protocols in
place, including requiring that the entire cooling bed be locked out and a
work authorization permit issued before technicians could enter the
space to perform the maintenance. Despite their awareness of these
procedures, the two employees entered the space without locking out the
cooling bed or obtaining a work permit. The mill's technician began to
de-energize the space to lock it out for the employees without knowing
that they were already in the area. Consequently, one of the
counterweights fell from an energized position and struck one of the
84
employees, killing him.1
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The Secretary issued a citation for a serious violation for failure to
adhere to the "lock-out, tag-out" procedures. 85 When Action contested
the citation, the ALJ vacated the citation on the basis that the fans and
counterweights were different machines, and thus, the employees were
not required to lock out the counterweights prior to servicing the fans. 186
The secretary petitioned for review from the Commission, but because
they could not attain a majority opinion with two members, they had to
adopt the findings of the ALJ.187
Importantly, the Secretary's interpretation of its own regulation is
entitled to more deference and credence than the Commission's
interpretation because the Secretary is responsible for the overall
implementation of the Act's policy objectives. 8 8 The Secretary
interpreted the regulation at issue to say that two pieces are part of one
machine if they do not function independently of one another or are both
subparts to a larger machine. 8 9 Basically, a '"machine' is made up of
components that serve no other purpose besides the one they accomplish
together when operating simultaneously." 90 Therefore, it is not whether
these machines can operate independently but rather whether they serve
independent functions.' 9 ' Here, the counterweights and fans did not
serve independent functions but rather served a common function of
cooling the steel.1 92 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Secretary's
interpretation is aligned with the goals of the Act and was entitled to
deference here.193 The court vacated the Commission's decision and
reinstated the Secretary's citation.194
In Film Allman, LLC v. Secretary of Labor, 95 the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the decision that Film Allman willfully violated the general duty
clause of the Act and the imposition of the maximum penalty.196 Film
Allman was shooting scenes for its movie "Midnight Rider" in Jesup,
Georgia on an active train trestle. CSX Transportation actively uses the
trestle and refused Film Allman permission to use that portion of the
track. Therefore, Film Allman knew that there would be no CSX
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 1328.
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682 F. App'x 860 (11th Cir. 2017).
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representative there to stop or warn of any incoming train traffic. Despite
this, Film Allman not only went forward with filming their scenes but
did not advise their crew of any of this information. Tragically, a train
came through where filming was in process, killing one crew member and
injuring others.197
The Secretary conducted an investigation and issued a citation for
multiple violations, including a willful violation of the "general duty
clause,"19 8 for failing to implement safety procedures for filming on the
trestle thereby exposing its employees to the hazard of being stuck by a
train.199 Film Allman contested the citation. 02o The ALJ affirmed the
violation of the standard and imposed the maximum penalty of
$70,000.201 The Commission declined to review the decisions, and thus,
the ALJ's decision was automatically adopted. 202 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit held that upon review of the record, there was substantial
evidence to support the finding of a willful violation and it was not an
abuse of discretion to impose the maximum fine of $70,000.203

V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
In G4S Secure Solutions Inc. v. NLRB,204 the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that the
employer's policy prohibiting the wearing of insignia on security guards'
uniforms violated the NLRA,205 and the remedy imposed should. be
enforced nationwide. 206 G4S Secure Solutions (G4S) is a security
contractor that has clients across the United States. The location at issue
here is in Phoenix, Arizona, where they provided security along the
Valley Metro Rail. G4S provides all its security officers with a handbook
that includes a policy indicating what is considered a "professional
image." The policy stated:
You must be neat and clean while on duty. You must wear only the
complete uniform as prescribed by your supervisor ....

197. Id. at 861.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.

201. Id.
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Id. at 862.
707 F. App'x 610, 611 (11th Cir. 2017).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
G4S Secure Sols. Inc., 707 F. App'x at 612.
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Due to the public nature of our business and the business necessity
that uniformed personnel represent figures of authority, we have
established the following rules for personal appearance.
No insignias, emblems, buttons, or items other than those issued by
the company may be worn on the uniform without expressed
permission. 207
The International Union, Security, Police and Fire Professionals of
America filed a charge with the NLRB stating, among other unfair labor
practices, the handbook contained overly-broad work rules. The Board
held that several of the policies, including the third paragraph of the
"professional image" section, could reasonably be construed as
prohibiting protected activity covered under § 7 of the Act. As a result of
this finding, the Board ordered G4S to rescind its policy, and the Board
would either revise or issue a new policy in its place and provide it to all
employees even those in other locations. In addition, it required that G4S
post two notices: one for the Phoenix facility and the other to be posted
nationwide. 208
On review, the Eleventh Circuit must uphold any factual findings
under the "any evidence" standard. 209 Therefore in this case, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the Board's findings including the remedy
ordered. 210 While G4S argued that the no-insignia rule was limited to
personnel while they were "on duty," the court disagreed. 211 The court
held that only the "neat and clean" portion applied to someone while on
duty; whereas, the no-insignia rule did not have the same qualifier. 212
Thus, a reasonable person could assume that the no-insignia rule applied
to both on and off duty personnel while wearing the uniform. 213 As to the
remedy, the court gave "significant deference" to the Board. 214 The court
stated that where a policy is implemented nation-wide or company-wide,
the remedy must follow suit to be effective. 215 The court ordered the
Board's order to be enforced. 2 1 6
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VI. CONCLUSION

The futures of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the National
Labor Relations Act depend, in large part, on the agency determinations
by the United States Department of Labor and the National Labor
Relations Board, respectively. How the law will evolve, and change,
remains to be seen. While commentators fear that agency changes will
begin to erode workers' rights, 217 at least for now, the cases above give
practitioners some guidance for the time being.

217. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Labor Policy is in the Midst of a Shift Under Trump, CHICAGO
TRIB., http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-trump-policies-overtime-nlrb-0719-biz2017 0718-story.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
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